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ARTICLES
A PRESUMPTIVELY BETTER APPROACH TO
ARBITRABILITY
John A.E. Pottow, Jacob Brege, and Tara J. Hawley*
One of the most complex problems in the arbitration field is the
question of who decides disputes over the scope of an arbitrator’s
purported authority. Courts in Canada and the United States have
taken different approaches to this fundamental question of “arbitr-
ability” that necessarily arises when one party disputes the
contractual validity of the underlying “container” contract carrying
the arbitration clause. If arbitration is a creature of contract, and
contract is a product of consensual agreement, then any dispute that
impugns the underlying consent of the parties to the container
contract implicates the arbitration agreement itself (i.e., no contract,
no arbitration agreement).
The U.S. approach of “separability” dates back a half-century to a
Supreme Court case that was controversial when it was decided and
remains so today. The Supreme Court has added several more
decisions trying to clarify its arbitratbility rules within just the past
few years. The Canadians too have tried to sort out this mess, seizing
upon the hoary legal distinction between law and fact, also offering
recent Supreme Court pronouncements. Neither country’s approach
is normatively or functionally satisfying.
After discussing and critiquing the two approaches comparatively, we
offer our own proposal. We too deploy legal presumptions, but in our
case we focus on what we contend are the two most relevant criteria:
* John A.E. Pottow is professor of law, University of Michigan; Jacob Brege and
Tara J. Hawley are both 2012 J.D. graduates of the University of Michigan Law
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(1) the nature of the legal challenge to the underlying container
contract, and (2) the type of contract at issue. Challenges to consent
in contract formation and contracts involving adhesion should be
specially scrutinized by the courts before carting parties off to
arbitration, whereas commercial agreements between sophisticated
actors should presumptively be for arbitral resolution, even for
“constitutive” challenges to the underlying contract.
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is often espoused as a faster and simpler alternative
to litigation, but it is beset with an array of jurisdictional and
theoretical challenges. This article looks at one such problem: the
thorny question of “arbitrability.” An arbitrability dispute arises
when parties to a contract with an arbitration provision have a
dispute not just on the subject matter of the contract itself (e.g.,
was Clause Four breached?), but on the quasi-jurisdictional
question of whether their dispute falls under the arbitration clause
(e.g., do Clause Four disputes fall under the agreement to
arbitrate?). Indeed, one of the most difficult arbitrability questions
is the meta-dispute of who decides — court or arbitrator — such a
quasi-jurisdictional dispute (e.g., should the arbitrator or a judge
get to decide as a contractual interpretation matter whether Clause
Four disputes are subject to the arbitration provision?). Arbitr-
ability is at its most problematic when a “constitutive” challenge is
made to a contract, such as a claim of fraud or unconscionability,
because such claims undermine the very foundation of the
underlying contract that contains the arbitration provision.
Taking a comparative stance, focusing particularly on the
United States and Canada, this article offers a unique approach to
the “Who Decides?” question of arbitrability that has bedeviled
arbitration commentators for years, by combining elements of the
approaches of both jurisdictions. The article proceeds in several
stages. Part II outlines the U.S. approach, starting with the rule of
separability that was established in Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Company,1 and later developed and refined in
subsequent case law. Part III turns to the Canadian Supreme
Court’s recent wadings into the arbitrability waters: Dell Computer
Corp. v. Union des Consommateurs,2 describing a different
approach to questions of arbitrability (one that is based on the
1. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
2. (2007), 284 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801 (S.C.C.) .
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distinction between legal and factual disputes), including its first
implementation in Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc.3 Finally,
Part IV offers a more nuanced tack than the categorical routes
taken on both sides of the border. The suggested approach turns
on the type of dispute and the type of contract, proposing
jurisdictional presumptions based on those classifications.
II. ARBITRABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES
The concept of arbitrability — the question whether a dispute
over arbitration is itself arbitrable — presents the complex and
important question whether the parties to a contract containing an
arbitration clause should be required to raise a meta-dispute over
the contested scope of that clause before an arbitrator or a judge.4
The root of the problem lies in the fact that arbitration is a
function of contract and therefore of voluntary agreement.5 Thus,
if the parties did not agree to arbitrate a specific dispute (or quarrel
over whether they did), one can see the attraction of saying that
these meta-disputes must be resolved by a court as a condition
precedent to arbitration. Only after a court confirms that the
parties did indeed agree to waive their rights to dispute resolution
in a courtroom can one be comfortable stripping the parties of
their baseline juridical rights and shipping them off to arbitration.
On the other hand, the whole point of arbitration is to facilitate
streamlined dispute resolution and get away from judges; marching
off to court to clear the underbrush of a threshold dispute may kill
the very purpose for which the parties sought arbitration in the
first place (even though one party now resists its reach): non-
judicial and speedy resolution of legal disagreements.6
3. (2011), 329 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2011 SCC 15 (S.C.C.).
4. This article does not explore the broader question of when certain legal disputes
cannot be resolved by arbitrators as a matter of public policy. Although many
jurisdictions deem certain disputes “non-arbitrable,” see generally Robert
Kovacs, “A Transnational Approach to the Arbitrability of International
Insolvency Proceedings in International Arbitrations,” paper presented to
International Insolvency Institute (Paris, France, June, 2012), available:
5http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/viewdownload/391/
5914.html4, the embrace of arbitration is so robust in the United States that this
form of “arbitrability” challenge almost never arises under U.S. law. See infra,
footnote 9.
5. See e.g., Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (“The FAA
reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.”); First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995), p. 943 (“Arbitration is
simply a matter of contract between the parties; it is a way to resolve those
disputes — but only those disputes — that the parties have agreed to submit to
arbitration.”).
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1. Prima Paint and the Rule of Separability
The problem of arbitrability came to the fore in Prima Paint v.
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Company,7 in which one party
claimed fraud in the inducement of a sales contract that contained
an arbitration clause. (Arbitration commentators refer to the
broader agreement within which the specific arbitration provision
is contained as the “container” contract.)8 The Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) renders “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” a “written
provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce,” “save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”9 When
the buyer brought a rescission suit in federal district court, the
seller sought to compel arbitration under s. 3 of the FAA, citing the
arbitration clause.10
The buyer responded that there could be no arbitration because
his claim of fraud in the inducement of the container contract
rendered the whole agreement voidable, including any putative
agreement to arbitrate embedded therein.11 The seller retorted that
whether there was fraud was a dispute that could readily be
adjudicated by the arbitrator.12 Moreover, if there was no fraud —
as the seller unsurprisingly insisted there was not — then to drag
him off to court, with all litigation’s cost and delay, would be to
subject him to the very evil he was trying to avoid by including an
arbitration clause in his sales contract.13 The buyer replied that if
there was fraud — as the buyer unsurprisingly insisted there was —
the arbitration clause should get no enforcement as it flowed from
an invalid contract.14 And so on ad infinitum.
6. See, e.g., Solymar Investments, Ltd. v. Banco Santander S.A., 672 F.3d 981 (11th
Cir. 2012), p. 997 and note 17 (noting that requiring a court to investigate the
failure of an alleged oral condition precedent “would require a district court to
invade the province of the arbitrator” and that “such an inquiry would
necessitate extensive discovery and expend limited judicial resources”).
7. Supra, footnote 1.
8. See Michael H. Brady, “Exclusive Separability? Arbitrability and the Contract
Formation Defense” (2009), 28 Rev. Litig. 913, p. 917; David Horton,
“Arbitration as Delegation” (2011), 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 437, p. 449.
9. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (2006).
10. Prima Paint, supra, footnote 1, at p. 401.
11. Prima Paint, supra, at p. 408 (Black J. dissenting) (“Prima simply contended that
there was never a meeting of minds between the parties.”).
12. Prima Paint, supra, at p. 399.
13. See Prima Paint, supra, at p. 404.
14. See Prima Paint, supra, at p. 408 (Black J. dissenting).
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The U.S. Supreme Court thus had to answer “whether a claim
of fraud in the inducement of the entire contract [containing an
arbitration clause] is to be resolved by the federal court, or whether
the matter is to be referred to the arbitrators.”15 In crafting its
answer, the court divided disputes into two kinds of challenges a
grievant might bring to contractual validity. First, a claimant
might challenge the whole of the contract, as was the case in the
dispute before it, where the buyer alleged fraud in the inducement
of the entire container contract.16 Second, a claimant might
challenge just the validity of the arbitration agreement itself, but
not the rest of the broader contract.17 The court read s. 4 of the
FAA
18 to require the first kind of challenge to go before an
arbitrator but the second to go before a judge.19 Thus, if the
arbitration provision itself is alleged to be fraudulently induced
(“That clause? Oh, that’s nothing to worry about; we would never
insist on arbitration — just sign the contract!”), then the claimant
is entitled to make his case before a judge. But in the case of a
generalized challenge to the container contract as a whole, for
fraud in the inducement or similar grounds of contractual
invalidity, the dispute is consigned to the arbitrator. The
justification for this division is that an undifferentiated dispute
over the contract as a whole provides no reason to call into
question the validity of the arbitration agreement itself.20 In Prima
Paint, for example, the dispute was with the seller’s alleged
misrepresentation of its financial condition in negotiating the sale
of the business.21 The fraud (assuming it occurred) would have had
nothing to do with whether the parties consented to have business
disputes heard by an arbitrator. In effect, the court held that an
15. Prima Paint, supra, at p. 402.
16. Prima Paint, supra, at pp. 403-404.
17. Prima Paint, supra, at p. 403.
18. 9 U.S.C. § 4 reads in pertinent part:
The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court
shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with
the terms of the agreement.
19. Prima Paint, supra, footnote 1, at pp. 403-404:
Accordingly, if the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself —
an issue which goes to the ‘‘making’’ of the agreement to arbitrate— the federal court
may proceed to adjudicate it. But the statutory language does not permit the federal
court to consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally.
20. In concluding thus, the court read the term “contract” in s. 2 of the FAA to refer to
the contract to arbitrate itself. Therefore, arbitration was properly compelled
unless this contract was not “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” Prima Paint,
supra, at p. 412.
21. Prima Paint, supra, p. 398.
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agreement to arbitrate could be severed — as a matter of
substantive federal law under the FAA — from the rest of the
impugned contract, thus preserving the jurisdiction of the
arbitrator to hear even a dispute that would go to the underlying
enforceability of the contract that conferred her arbitral jurisdic-
tion.22 The rule of “separability,” and hence of presumptive
arbitrator competence to hear disputes of arbitrability, was born
into U.S. case law.23
Prima Paint was controversial from the moment it was decided.
A vigorous dissent rejected what it found to be the majority’s
“fantastic” holding,24 allowing arbitrators, who “need not even be
lawyers,” to “adjudicate the legal validity of the contract — an
arguable violation of due process.25 Instead, the dissent argued:26
Congress and the framers of the Act were at great pains to emphasize that
non-lawyers designated to adjust and arbitrate factual controversies arising
out of valid contracts would not trespass upon the courts’ prerogative to
decide the legal question of whether any legal contract exists upon which to
base an arbitration.
Scholars have similarly criticized separability,27 some calling for
the outright reversal of Prima Paint,28 others questioning its
22. Prima Paint, supra, at p. 405.
23. See Alan Scott Rau, “Everything You Really Need to Know About ‘Separability’
in Seventeen Simple Propositions” (2003), 14 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 1, pp. 34-35
(“The thrust of the doctrine of ‘separability,’ then, is to recognize the probable
competence of the arbitrators, by presuming that they have been entrusted by the
parties with the power to make a virtually non-reviewable decision on the issue of
validity.”). One author has called the result of such separability “implied
consent.” Richard C. Reuben, “First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the
Demise of Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitra-
tion Provisions (2003), 56 S.M.U. L. Rev. 819.
24. Prima Paint, supra, footnote 1, at p. 407 (Black J. dissenting).
25. Prima Paint, supra.
26. Prima Paint, supra, at p. 408. Further, while the dissent did not argue about
consent specifically, it did argue that the separability of any one provision from a
larger agreement should be determined by the intention of the parties. “Whether
a number of promises constitute one contract (and are non-separable) or more
than one is to be determined by inquiring ‘whether the parties assented to all the
promises as a single whole . . .’” Supra, at p. 424 (Black J. dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (1941), p. 298).
27. For an overview of various sources of critique, see Reuben, supra, footnote 23, p.
841; see also Larry J. Pittman, “The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme
Court’s Erroneous Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and A Proposal for
Change” (2002), 53 Ala. L. Rev. 789 (for a statutory-interpretation-based
critique).
28. See, e.g., Nancy R. Kornegay, ‘‘Prima Paint to First Options: The Supreme
Court’s Procrustean Approach to the Federal Arbitration Act and Fraud’’ (2001-
2002), 38 Hous. L. Rev. 335, p. 338.
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compatibility with contract law,29 and still others contesting its
logical soundness.30 Conversely, some arbitration enthusiasts have
defended separability, praising it as providing “the best baseline
rule in the context of the FAA, because it guarantees that
arbitration clauses will be enforceable, notwithstanding . . .
deficiencies in the underlying agreement.”31 It is safe to say that
there has been ongoing debate since the day Prima Paint was
decided. The Supreme Court itself has had to wade back into the
fray multiple times, clarifying the contours of the federal
presumption of arbitrability flowing from the separability rule.32
2. First Options and the Clear Statement Rule
In 1993, the Supreme Court faced another arbitrability issue in
First Options v. Kaplan.33 First Options had entered into an
agreement to work out debts with Manuel Kaplan, his wife, Carol
Kaplan, and Manuel’s wholly owned investment company, MK
Investments, Inc. (MKI).34 The workout agreement consisted of
four separate documents to compromise debts.35 After MKI lost an
29. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, “Rhetoric Versus Reality in Arbitration
Jurisprudence: How the Supreme Court Flaunts and Flunks Contracts” (2012),
75 Law & Contemp. Prob. 129 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s arbitration
rhetoric as incongruous with the court’s arbitration analysis); Stephen J. Ware,
“Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent” (1996), 25 Hofstra L. Rev.
83, p. 131:
[I]mposing duties based on speculations about what the parties would have
voluntarily consented to is profoundly different from imposing duties based on what
the parties did, in fact, voluntarily consent to. The former has no place in contract law
while the latter is the essence of contract law.
30. See, e.g., Richard L. Barnes, “Prima Paint Pushed Compulsory Arbitration
Under the Erie Train” (2007), 2 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 1 (“If a contract
is a legal nullity, it would seem intuitive that any lesser part would amount to
nothing as well.”).
31. Kirsten Weisenberger, “From Hostility to Harmony: Buckeye Marks A Mile-
stone in the Acceptance of Arbitration in American Jurisprudence” (2005), 16
Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 551, p. 558.
32. Indeed, this presumption of arbitrability is qualified by a “reverse presumption”
from the First Options opinion (discussed immediately infra), in which ambiguity
over an expressly contracted provision for arbitrability is interpreted strictly.
The law treats silence or ambiguity about the question who (primarily) should decide
arbitrability differently from the way it treats silence or ambiguity about the question
whether a particularmerits relateddispute is arbitrable because it iswithin the scopeof
a valid arbitration agreement — for in respect to this latter question the law reverses
the presumption.
First Options v. Kaplan, supra, footnote 5, pp. 944-945 (internal quotations
omitted).
33. Supra, footnote 5.
34. First Options, supra, at p. 940.
35. First Options, supra.
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additional $1.5 million under the workout, First Options
accelerated the debt and seized and liquidated MKI’s assets,
demanding payment from the Kaplans for the deficiency.36 When
its demand went unsatisfied, First Options sought arbitration.37 Of
the four workout documents, only one contained an arbitration
agreement, and though this agreement was signed by MKI, it was
never signed by either of the Kaplans.38
The Kaplans thus denied that any dispute to which they were a
party was arbitrable and petitioned the arbitrators accordingly.39
The arbitrators decided that the arbitrability meta-dispute of the
Kaplans based on lack of signatory authority was itself arbitrable
(i.e., that the arbitrators could properly decide the question); found
against the Kaplans on that meta-dispute (namely, that they could
be forced to arbitrate the corporate dispute notwithstanding their
lack of signature); and ultimately ruled for First Options on the
merits of the workout dispute in arbitration.40 The Kaplans then
asked a federal district court to vacate the arbitration award
pursuant to s. 10 of the FAA, and First Options requested
confirmation of the award pursuant to s. 9.41 The district court
confirmed the award, but an appellate court reversed.42
On further appeal, the Supreme Court framed the issue as “who
has the primary power to decide arbitrability?”43 That question,
the court reasoned, “turns upon what the parties agreed about that
matter.”44
If . . . the parties did not agree to submit the arbitrability question itself to
arbitration, then the court should decide that question just as it would decide
any other question that the parties did not submit to arbitration, namely,
independently.45
Accordingly, ‘‘courts should not assume that the parties agreed
to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’
36. First Options, supra.
37. First Options, supra.
38. First Options, supra, at p. 941.
39. First Options, supra. Manuel Kaplan participated in the arbitration as the sole
owner of MKI which is presumably why he addressed his signature dispute to the
arbitrators whom he claimed lacked authority to bind him.
40. First Options, supra.
41. First Options, supra.
42. First Options, supra.
43. First Options, supra, at p. 943.
44. First Options, supra.
45. First Options, supra.
172 CanadianBusiness LawJournal [Vol. 53
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evidence that they did so.’’46 The court noted the signature dispute
and concluded that47
because the Kaplans did not clearly agree to submit the question of
arbitrability to arbitration [and their pleading of the arbitrability dispute
before the arbitrators did not constitute a waiver], the Court of Appeals was
correct in finding that the arbitrability of the Kaplan/First Options dispute
was subject to independent review by the courts.
The court based this conclusion on the finding that “First Options
cannot show that the Kaplans clearly agreed to have the
arbitrators decide (i.e., to arbitrate) the question of arbitrabil-
ity.”48
The court’s opinion in First Options engendered more scholarly
comment49 and, worse, more confusion among lower U.S.
courts.50 Some scholars saw the rules of Prima Paint and First
Options as in desperate need of harmonization,51 while others
rejected any tension.52 One scholar went so far as to declare First
Options the death knell of Prima Paint, and as such “the demise of
separability,” which is “appropriate as a matter of theory,
doctrine, and practicality.”53 At the root of the problem were
two seemingly opposed propositions: first, that arbitration
agreements are presumed separable, and thus even attacks on the
constitutive validity of the contract as a whole, such as fraud in the
inducement, are presumed to go to arbitration for resolution (a
presumption of arbitrability, per Prima Paint); and second, that
because arbitration is a creature of contract, parties must have a
clear and unmistakable contractual intent to assign arbitrability
46. First Options, supra, at p. 944.
47. First Options, supra, at p. 947 (alterations added).
48. First Options, supra, at p. 946.
49. See, e.g., Reuben, supra, footnote 23, p. 870.
50. For example cases see Alan Scott Rau, “The Arbitrability Question Itself” (1999),
10 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 287, p. 332, note 121; see also Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All
American Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2001), p. 590 (noting that “Prima Paint
. . . sits uneasily alongside AT&T Technologies and First Options”).
51. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, “Arbitration Law’s Separability Doctrine After
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna” (2007), 8 Nev. L.J. 107, pp. 113-114:
[The] holdingofFirstOptions indicates that the separabilitydoctrine does not apply to
the issue of whether particular parties ‘‘agreed to arbitrate’’ because the separability
doctrine gives arbitrators the power to decide issues subject only to the deferential
standard of review in FAA section 10.
52. See Rau, supra, footnote 23, at p. 96 (“First Options adds nothing that is
particularly fresh or compelling — nothing that we could not already have
assumed.”).
53. Reuben, supra, footnote 23, at p. 872.
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questions to an arbitrator (a presumption against arbitrability, per
First Options).
In 2006, the Supreme Court weighed back in and reaffirmed its
commitment to the rule of separability in Buckeye Check Cashing,
Inc. v. Cardegna.54 In that case, John Gardegna and Donna
Reuter, signatories of a short-term lending contract with an
arbitration clause, sought certification of a class action, alleging
that “Buckeye charged usurious interest rates and that the
Agreement violated various Florida lending and consumer-
protection laws, rendering it criminal on its face.”55 Buckeye
moved to compel arbitration.56 The trial court denied the motion,
holding that “a court rather than an arbitrator should resolve a
claim that a contract is illegal and void ab initio.”57 While the
Florida Supreme Court agreed — holding the tainted arbitration
agreement void by its situation within an illegal contract — the
U.S. Supreme Court granted leave and reversed.58 In reversing the
Florida Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court held fast to
Prima Paint:59
First, as a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration
provision is severable from the remainder of the contract. Second, unless the
challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract’s validity
is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance. Third, this arbitration law
applies in state as well as federal courts.
Thus, in one respect, Buckeye went even further than Prima
Paint. In Prima Paint, the fraud in the inducement challenge based
on false accounting (arguably) said nothing about the parties’
amenability to have commercial disputes resolved by an arbitrator.
As such, arbitration of the fraud claim was permitted. In Buckeye,
the court held that, notwithstanding a rule of state law that made
the contract containing the arbitration clause illegal — unenforce-
able per se — arbitration, as agreed to in that contract, could still
go forward as a matter of pre-emptive federal law under the FAA.60
54. 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
55. Buckeye Check Cashing, supra, at p. 442.
56. Buckeye Check Cashing, supra.
57. Buckeye Check Cashing, supra, at p. 443.
58. Buckeye Check Cashing, supra, at pp. 443 and 449. The U.S. Supreme Court had
jurisdiction because even though the Florida Supreme Court is the final expositor
of Florida contract law, the FAA is a federal statute with pre-emptive federal effect
and subject to final interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court.
59. Buckeye Check Cashing, supra, at pp. 445-446.
60. Buckeye Check Cashing, supra.
174 CanadianBusiness LawJournal [Vol. 53
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3. Arbitrability’s Zenith: Rent-A-Center and the Russian Dolls
The power of the separability rule rose to its zenith just recently
in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson.61 The dispute before the
Supreme Court for the first time raised the issue of a container
agreement that was itself an arbitration agreement. Jackson, an
employee of Rent-A-Center, had signed an agreement to arbitrate
all disputes arising from his employment contract with Rent-A-
Center.62 This agreement — separate from his employment
agreement — contained a provision termed by the court a
“delegation provision,” which further agreed to submit to
arbitration any challenge to the enforceability of the larger
arbitration agreement within which it was contained.63 When
Jackson brought suit for employment discrimination under federal
law, Rent-A-Center moved to stay proceedings and compel
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement.64 Jackson then
argued that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable under
Nevada law and hence could not bind him.65 Rent-A-Center,
relying on the delegation provision, argued that any challenge to
the container arbitration agreement as a whole had to be submitted
to arbitration.66
The federal district court dismissed Jackson’s claim, citing not
only Prima Paint but also the rule of First Options in finding that
the agreement by means of the delegation clause “clearly and
unmistakenly [sic]” conferred upon the arbitrator authority to
decide the validity of the arbitration agreement.67 The federal
appellate court reversed on the grounds that, although the text of
the agreement in isolation was clear in this delegation, Jackson’s
unconscionability claim called into question the assent necessary to
enforce the agreement containing this textual delegation. This
“threshold question of unconscionability,” it concluded, must
61. Supra, footnote 5; see generally Cunningham, supra, footnote 29, p. 140 (calling
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson the “apotheosis of the separation of
arbitration jurisprudence from contract law”).
62. This agreement included “claims for discrimination” and “claims for violation of
any federal . . . law.” Rent-A-Center, supra, at p. 2775.
63. Rent-A-Center, supra, at p. 2777.
64. Rent-A-Center, supra, at p. 2775.
65. Rent-A-Center, supra.
66. Rent-A-Center, supra. Neal R. Troum characterized the question facing the court
as a “Gordian knot.” “Another View of Rent-A-Center, Arbitration and
Arbitrability: Who Is Watching the Watchmen?” (2010), 28 Alternatives to High
Cost Litig. 184, p. 185.
67. Rent-A-Center, supra, at p. 2775 (internal quotations omitted).
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therefore be “for the court.”68 The Supreme Court, in a sharply
divided opinion, reversed again, dismissing Jackson’s claim and
compelling arbitration.69
The majority’s analysis began with FAA’s s. 2, which ensures the
validity of an agreement to arbitrate “save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”70
Drawing upon Prima Paint, it then applied the separability
analysis to the delegation provision, considering the larger
arbitration agreement in which it was nested the container
contract.71 In order to get to court, the majority concluded,
Jackson would had to have pled a deficiency in the delegation
clause specifically.72 Jackson never mentioned the delegation
provision in his submissions, instead insisting that the arbitration
agreement as a whole was unfair.73 The fact that the container
contract was itself an arbitration agreement, under this analysis,
was of no consequence; a validity challenge to the whole is
separable and can be arbitrated.74
The dissent criticized the majority’s reasoning, raising two
principal objections. First, under the First Options clear statement
rule of arbitrability, ‘‘[c]ourts should not assume that the parties
agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is clear and
unmistakable evidence that they did so.’’75 So-called “gateway”
issues — such as those that speak to whether there has been free
assent to the contract — must necessarily be decided prior to
enforcement of a contractual arbitration agreement.76 Because
unconscionability would undermine or even negate the assent
necessary to agree to arbitration, the dissent complained (agreeing
with the Court of Appeals), there could be no “clear and
unmistakable” voluntary agreement to arbitrate arbitrability under
First Options.77
68. Jackson v. Rent-A-Center West, Inc., 581 F.3d 912 (2009), at p. 917.
69. Rent-A-Center, supra, footnote 5, at p. 2781.
70. The text of the statute provides that:
[A] written provision in . . . a contract evidencing commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract. [9 U.S.C. § 2]
71. Rent-A-Center, supra, footnote 5, at pp. 2777-2779.
72. Rent-A-Center, supra, at p. 2779.
73. Rent-A-Center, supra.
74. Rent-A-Center, supra.
75. Rent-A-Center, supra, at p. 2783 (Stevens J. dissenting) (quoting First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, supra, footnote 5, at p. 944).
76. Rent-A-Center, supra, at p. 2782.
77. Rent-A-Center, supra, at p. 2785.
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Worse, in the dissent’s view, was the majority’s perversion of the
Prima Paint rule of separability. Instead of being irrelevant, the
fact that the underlying container agreement concerned “exclu-
sively arbitration” should have “ma[de] all the difference in the
Prima Paint analysis.”78 A challenge to the whole contract, rather
than being indeterminate, as it was in Prima Paint, must on the
contrary necessarily have been an objection to arbitration. Recall
the rationale of Prima Paint was that the buyer’s claim that the
seller cooked the books said nothing about the buyer’s amenability
or antipathy toward arbitration of business disputes. Here,
Jackson was challenging an arbitration agreement as unconscion-
able, which could mean nothing other than Jackson’s aversion to
arbitration. The dissent thus protested that Prima Paint was being
turned on its head.79
Moreover, the dissent contended, the majority misapplied Prima
Paint with respect to the relevant agreement to which it pertained.
In the case before the court, there were actually three levels of
agreement: the employment contract (“the employment agree-
ment”), the separately signed agreement to arbitrate disputes under
the employment contract (“the arbitration agreement”), and the
agreement to arbitrate disputes about the arbitration agreement
contained within that arbitration agreement (“the arbitrability
agreement”). The majority considered the arbitrability agreement
to be separable from the arbitration agreement, with Jackson’s
attack to the whole of the latter being fatal to his (unspecified)
objections to the former. The dissent, by contrast, felt Jackson’s
specific objections to the arbitration contract were quintessentially
what Prima Paint would distinguish from a generalized challenge
to the employment contract as a whole and hence permit to be
raised before a judge. Calling one clause of that arbitration
agreement a separate “arbitrability agreement,” which would
require its own specific challenge under Prima Paint to open the
courtroom door, had the ridiculous consequence in the dissent’s
view of creating an infinite separability regression, plucking
agreements from agreements and creating a “Russian nesting
doll” effect.80
Like its predecessors, Rent-A-Center has engendered strong
criticism among scholars, but it is the Supreme Court’s most recent
78. Rent-A-Center, supra, at p. 2782.
79. See Rent-A-Center, supra.
80. Rent-A-Center, supra, at p. 2786.
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pronouncement on separability.81 As such, the approach in the
United States is now one of strong arbitrability: it is almost
impossible to plead a claim of contractual infirmity that will be
heard by a court.82 Under Prima Paint, as affirmed and amplified
by Rent-A-Center, litigants are almost invariably presumed to have
consented to arbitrators’ adjudications of meta-disputes on the
scope and validity of arbitration agreements. These include such
fundamental matters as contractual unconscionability, if the
challenges (as most such challenges necessarily and logically will)
impugn the whole of the broader container contract.83
4. Granite Rock’s Refinement (and Retrenchment?)
Three days after Rent-A-Center was decided, the U.S. Supreme
Court handed down Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood
of Teamsters.84 In a much less-fractured opinion, the court
reiterated and endorsed a distinction adverted to in the opening
footnote of Buckeye: namely, that the presumption of arbitrability
only arises after a court has concluded that a proper contract with
an arbitration clause has “come into existence” in the first place. In
strong language, it characterized judicial confirmation of a
properly formed contract prior to ordering arbitration as being a
“first principle” of its case law and a logical consequence of
arbitration being a creature of consensual contract.
The facts of the case were idiosyncratic. Granite Rock got into a
dispute with its labour union regarding a work stoppage that
occurred alongside the renegotiation of a new collective bargaining
agreement (CBA). The stoppage took place in a possible no-man’s
land occurring after the old CBA expired but (arguably) before the
new CBA took effect. Although both CBAs contained arbitration
81. See, e.g., Jennifer Schulz, “Arbitrating Arbitrability: How the U.S. Supreme
Court Empowered the Arbitrator at the Expense of the Judge and the Average
Joe” (2011), 44 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1269, p. 1270 (calling for congressional action).
82. See, e.g., Carlo Marichal, “Arbitrating Issues You Might Not Have Agreed to:
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson” (2011), 12 Fla. Coastal L. Rev. 485, p. 500
(arguing that the decision “essentially precludes the employee from seeking
redress from the courts”).
83. At least one scholar discussing pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements has
gone so far as to say that ‘‘an argument can be made that, when arbitration
clauses are involved, federal courts have, in effect, gone beyond promoting
neutrality in contracting and have created a special class of ‘super enforceable’
contracts.’’ Sandra F. Gavin, ‘‘Unconscionability Found: A Look at Pre-Dispute
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements 10 Years after Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto’’ (2006), 54 Clev. St. L. Rev. 249, p. 250.
84. 130 S.Ct. 2847 (2010).
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clauses, Granite Rock contended that the work stoppage dispute
could not go to arbitration before answering the threshold
question whether this dispute arose, in the words of the
agreements, “under the [CBA].” This answer in turn depended on
the new CBA start date, which was itself in dispute given a
ratification anomaly. If there was no ratified CBA during the work
stoppage, reasoned Granite Rock, there was no arbitration clause
to enforce regarding that dispute. But the parties hotly disagreed
over when that ratification date was and so needed that dispute
resolved first.
A federal trial court decided it had jurisdiction to hear the
ratification-date question and held a jury trial, which found that
the CBA had indeed been ratified before the work stoppage and
thus the labour dispute was arbitrable. The court of appeals,
however, found that the district court had no jurisdiction over the
ratification-date fight in the first place — citing Prima Paint and
the strong national policy favouring arbitration of disputes —
because it was a challenge to the whole of the (CBA) contract, not
just the arbitration clause.
In chiding the appellate court for “overreading” its arbitration
precedents, the Supreme Court reversed. It approved the trial
court’s judicial resolution of the ratification-date dispute (which in
turn counseled arbitral resolution of the labour dispute). It
distinguished Buckeye and like cases as involving a challenge to
a container contract that was unquestionably formed — but held
illegal ex post under state law (and hence lacking what it called
“validity”) — from ones, such as the instant cause, about whether
a container contract was “ever concluded” in the first place. Far
from recognizing a tension with Prima Paint (or Rent-A-Center),
the court treated the issue as an entirely distinct question that
arises well before the separability rule might ever be invoked.
Although using some terminology interchangeably, the court
emphasized a distinction from the Buckeye footnote between
“formation” disputes, which it held would be for courts to decide,
and “validity” disputes, which would presumptively be for
arbitrators under the Prima Paint separability rule.85 (It also
effectively acknowledged a third type: “enforceability” or ‘‘applic-
85. Thomas J. tried to adhere to this approach in the following year’s Concepcion
case at the Supreme Court, but had to write a separate concurring opinion there,
suggesting already some departure from his proposed framework. See AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Vincent Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011), pp. 1753-1756
(Thomas J. concurring).
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ability’’ disputes, which it held would be presumptively for courts
to decide, under a “reverse presumption,” but which could be
consigned to arbitrators in the presence of a “valid provision
specifically committing such disputes to an arbitrator.”)86
Granite Rock was thus an attempt by the court to clear up some
of the tensions in its case law, which perhaps explains why it
reached out to resolve the case. (As the dissenting justices pointed
out, given the fact that the new CBA expressly made itself
retroactive in effect, the ratification-date fight was ultimately
unnecessary, as any dispute should have been arbitrable, because
there was no no-man’s land problem at all; the majority’s only
response to this point was that this seemingly dispositive retro-
activity argument was procedurally forfeited by belated pleading!)
On the one hand, Granite Rock seems to have scaled back Prima
Paint’s separability rule, by deeming “formation” disputes to be
simply outside its scope. On the other hand, the reach of this carve-
out is quite narrow, with offered examples being the lack of
signatory authority seen in First Options, or the lack of mental
capacity to assent referenced in the Buckeye footnote. Pointedly,
neither the fraud of Prima Paint nor the unconscionabilty of Rent-
A-Center were seen as “formation issues” under the Granite Rock
carve-out, even though both arguably imperil meaningful consent
to contract. Thus, the underlying normative critique of Prima
Paint remains unanswered: what to do about carting parties off to
arbitration who do not fully consent by contract to such a fate.
86. In First Options, the court explained: “Courts should not assume that the
parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] and unmistak-
abl[e]’ evidence that they did so.” At p. 944 (citing AT&T Technologies, Inc. v.
Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643 (1986), p. 649). Some courts
appear to struggle with these possibly overlapping distinctions. See, e.g., Janiga
v. Questar Capital Corp., 615 F.3d 735 (7th Cir. 2010), pp. 738 and 742
(suggesting any existence dispute could be conferred to an arbitrator and
interpreting an “enforceability” dispute, such as an argument of procedural
unconscionability, as one that would be presumptively for arbitration and not,
as Granite Rock’s discussion of enforceability would suggest, for courts). In
fact, the court in Granite Rock at various points discusses issues of an
arbitration agreement’s “scope,” “enforceability,” “consent,” and “formation”
as threshold matters to be resolved by courts — all distinguished from
“validity.” Granite Rock, supra, footnote 84, passim. Needless to say, confusion
still abounds; at least one court felt the need to explain why Granite Rock did
not overrule Prima Paint! See Solymar Investments, supra, footnote 6, at p. 990,
note 9.
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III. CANADA’S WAY
1. Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des Consommateurs
The Supreme Court of Canada recently explored issues
regarding arbitrability in Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des
Consommateurs.87 Although the case centered on an issue of
statutory interpretation of Québec procedural law, it also offered
the court an opportunity, which it took, to weigh in on
arbitrability. Analyzing this complex case first requires under-
standing the animating statutory issue, which in turn requires brief
summary of the case’s bizarre facts. On Friday, April 4, 2003,
Dell’s English-language website incorrectly listed wildly low prices
for two of its products.88 On April 5, 2003, Dell became aware of
these mistakes and blocked access to the order pages “through the
ordinary [web] address,” but did not take down the (outdated)
pages where the incorrect prices were still listed.89 Oliver
Dumoulin was able to access the outdated page with the incorrect
prices through a “deep link” e-mailed to him by an unknown
individual.90 The deep link went directly to the flawed page,
bypassing the rest of the Dell website, stymying the blocks Dell
erected to fix the error. Delighting computer hackers and
anarchists everywhere, Dumoulin ordered on this webpage a
computer for a well-below-market price of $89.91
When Dell contacted Dumoulin to inform him that it would not
honour the order, Dumoulin paired with the Union and sought
authorization of a class action for consumer protection law
violations.92 Dell sought arbitration pursuant to an arbitration
clause contained in the terms and conditions of the sale contract.93
Complicating matters legally, a governing Québec statute forbade
waivers of court jurisdiction (arbitration is a waiver of court
jurisdiction) in consumer disputes involving a “foreign element.”94
Hence, a novel statutory question involving arbitration arose:
87. Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des Consommateurs, supra, footnote 2.
88. The Axim X5 300 MHz handheld computer was listed at $89 instead of $379 and
Axim X5 400 MHz handheld computer was listed at $118 instead of $549. Dell
Computer, supra, para. 4.
89. Dell Computer, supra.
90. Dell Computer, supra.
91. Dell Computer, supra.
92. Dell Computer, supra, para. 5.
93. Dell Computer, supra.
94. Dell Computer, supra, para. 6. This statute would be an example of a policy-based
arbitrability restriction. See supra, footnote 4.
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whether an arbitration agreement invoking U.S. arbitration rules
contains a “foreign element” that renders the arbitration clause
invalid under Québec procedural law.95 The trial court concluded
that it does.96 It reasoned that because the arbitration agreement
referred the dispute to arbitration rules connected with the United
States, it contained a “foreign element” and thus constituted an
impermissible waiver of court jurisdiction pursuant to Civil Code
of Québec97 (C.C.Q.) art. 3149.98 The court accordingly denied
arbitration under the flawed contract (and, incidentally, also
authorized the class action against Dell).99
The Supreme Court of Canada reversed this statutory construc-
tion, holding that “[u]nlike the foreign element, which suggests a
possible connection with a foreign state, arbitration is an
institution without a forum and without a geographic basis.”100
The statutory question having been resolved, the court then
addressed arbitrability: under Québec law, should the trial court
have decided this statutory question in the first place, or should
Dell have been able to compel Dumoulin to present it to an
arbitrator?101
95. Dell Computer, supra, paras. 6-11.
96. Dell Computer, supra, para. 6.
97. L.R.Q., c. C-1991.
98. Dell Computer, supra, footnote 2. Art. 3149 C.C.Q. also provides:
A Québec authority also has jurisdiction to hear an action involving a consumer
contract or a contract of employment if the consumer or worker has his domicile or
residence in Québec; the waiver of such jurisdiction by the consumer or worker may
not be set up against him.
See Dell Computer, supra, para. 180.
99. Dell Computer, supra, para. 5. Dell has its Canadian head office in Toronto and a
place of business in Montreal. Supra, para. 4.
100. Dell Computer, supra, para. 51. Even if they are foreign rules, the court reasoned,
“[t]he rules become those of the parties, regardless of where they are taken from.”
Supra, para. 52. Just before the Dell Computer decision was handed down,
Québec passed a law banning arbitration agreements in consumer contracts,
perhaps as a legislative response to the lower court opinion. See Shelley McGill,
“Consumer Arbitration after Seidel v. Telus” (2011), 51 C.B.L.J. 187, p. 191
(referencing art. 11.1 of the Québec Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q., c. P-40.1).
Curiously, the court declined to dismiss the pending appeal as moot in the face of
this enactment. Its justification for the continued expenditure of judicial
resources in this context was that Québec’s ban was not retroactive and so the
specific case at bar required resolution (beyond the resolution already provided
by the trial and appellate courts). Dell Computer, supra, footnote 2, paras. 117-
120.
101. Dell Computer, supra, para. 68.
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2. Who Decides? Competence-Competence
The Dell court outlined two schools of thought on the question
of “who decides” arbitrability, both taken from international
commercial law.102 The first sends the dispute directly to court in
order to avoid duplication. After all, “since the court has the
power to review the arbitrator’s decision regarding his or her
jurisdiction, why should the arbitrator be allowed to make an
initial ruling on this issue?”103 The second, known as “competence-
competence,” grants arbitrators the capacity to rule on their own
jurisdiction out of concern with preventing delay tactics.104
The competence-competence approach is commonly used (as
indeed is the doctrine of separability) in international commercial
arbitration.105 The widespread use of these doctrines can be
attributed to the fact that “[t]he doctrines, taken together, ensure
that the parties’ intent to arbitrate any disputes that arise out of
their international contractual relationship is effectuated without
undue court interference.”106 The ensuing certainty of arbitrator
authority, proponents contend, facilitates international com-
merce.107 The competence-competence principle has also been
divided into what are called its “positive” and “negative”
applications.108 “Positive” competence-competence accords arbi-
trators the authority to decide their own authority, but not in any
way that precludes parallel court adjudication of the same
question. Thus, positive competence-competence ‘‘means that . .
. arbitrators are empowered to rule on their own jurisdiction; they
are not required to stay [their] proceeding to seek judicial
guidance.’’109 Negative competence-competence goes further and
‘‘holds that in order to allow arbitrators to rule on their own
102. Dell Computer, supra, para. 69.
103. Dell Computer, supra.
104. Dell Computer, supra, para. 70.
105. See Robert H. Smit, “Separability and Competence-Competence in International
Arbitration: Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit? Or Can Something Indeed Come from
Nothing?” (2002), 13 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 19, p. 19 (“These two doctrines have
appropriately been called the conceptual cornerstones of international arbitration
as an autonomous and effective form of international dispute resolution.”).
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid., at pp. 22-23.
108. John J. Barcelo III, “Who Decides the Arbitrators’ Jurisdiction? Separability and
Competence-Competence in Transnational Perspective,” (2003) 36 Vand. J.
Transnat’l L. 1115, p. 1124.
109. Ibid.
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jurisdiction . . . as an initial matter, court jurisdiction . . . should be
constrained.’’110
Section 943 of Québec’s Code of Civil Procedure111 codifies a
form of positive competence-competence, providing that “[t]he
arbitrators may decide the matter of their own competence.”112
Section 943.1 softens this broad grant of arbitrability power,
however, by qualifying that “[i]f the arbitrators declare themselves
competent during the proceedings, a party may within thirty days
of being notified thereof apply to the court for a decision on that
matter.”113 Finally, s. 940.1 directs the court to “refer [parties to an
arbitration agreement] to arbitration on the application of either of
them unless the case has been inscribed on the roll or it finds the
agreement null.”114 The majority in Dell read this text to
incorporate the “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed” test from the New York Convention115 to allocate
arbitrability, which is essentially an application of positive
competence-competence.116 Thus, arbitrators are given the initial
capacity to decide their own competence, but courts have
concurrent jurisdiction based on the possible nullity of the
arbitration agreement.
3. Judicial Review of Who Decides
The Dell court then discussed the question that logically follows:
if a court may trump the arbitrator’s competence–competence to
decide an arbitrability dispute if the contract is “null and void”
under s. 940.1, how intensive should the judicial scrutiny of
voidness be? (Similarly, if a court may review an arbitrator’s
assessment of jurisdiction under s. 943.1, what standard of review
should apply?) As one scholar frames the question, if courts are
110. Ibid. France, for example, which popularized the concept of negative compe-
tence-competence, interprets the rule as meaning if “the arbitral tribunal has not
yet been seized of the matter,” unless the agreement is “manifestly null,” the
courts must decline jurisdiction. Ibid., at pp. 1124-1125.
111. R.S.Q., c. C-25.
112. Dell Computer, supra, footnote 2, para. 79.
113. Dell Computer, supra.
114. Dell Computer, supra.
115. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
330 U.N.T.S. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, [1986] Can. T.S. No. 43.
116. Dell Computer, supra, para. 83:
However, since this provisionwas adopted in the context of the implementation of the
New York Convention (the words of which, in art. II(3), are ‘‘null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed’’), I do not consider a literal interpreta-
tion to be appropriate.
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allowed to set aside arbitration agreements that are “null and
void” under the New York Convention:117
Are the courts required to inquire into the merits of the existence and validity
of the arbitration agreement or must they restrict their control to a prima
facie verification that the arbitration agreement exists and is valid . . . ?
Dumoulin argued for “what has been called the ‘comprehensive
approach’ following which the objections to the validity of the
arbitration agreement should be dealt with comprehensively before
the matter is referred (or not) to arbitration.”118 Dell argued for
the less intrusive prima facie approach, by which a “court seized of
a referral application should refer the matter to arbitration upon
being satisfied on a prima facie basis that the action was not
commenced in breach of a valid arbitration agreement.”119
The court’s response was somewhat mixed. While adopting an
approach that it later contended was more consistent with the
prima facie approach,120 it seemed determined — presumably on
the mission of providing structure and guidance to lower courts —
to establish a categorical methodology. The court interpreted the
null and void standard to require most arbitrability disputes to go
to arbitration (subject to judicial review under positive compe-
tence-competence) but to permit some to stay in court, depending
on the type of dispute. In so doing, it considered several ways to
draw this categorical distinction. The most interesting one it
considered in some detail drew a line between “applicability” and
“validity.”121 Such an approach would grant courts the power to
resolve arbitrability challenges that go to the “validity” of the
container agreement, while arbitrators would resolve claims that
go merely toward its “applicability.” The court ultimately rejected
this approach, however, noting that while workable, it was not well
supported by decisions of Québec courts.122
117. Emmanuel Gaillard, “Prima Facie Review of Existence, Validity of Arbitration
Agreement”, The New York Law Journal, December 1, 2005, at p. 7, available at
5http://www.nylj.com4 or 5http://www.shearman.com/ia_040308_14/4.
118. Dell Computer, supra, footnote 2, para. 169 (Bastarache and LeBel JJ. dissenting).
119. Dell Computer, supra, para. 168 (Bastarache and LeBel JJ. dissenting).
120. Dell Computer, supra, para. 83.
121. Dell Computer, supra, para. 82. This suggestion comes from Frédéric Bachand,
L’intervention du juge canadien avant et durant un arbitrage commercial interna-
tional (Cowansville, Québec, Yvon Blais, 2005).
122. Dell Computer, supra, footnote 2.
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The court instead selected a standard based on the distinction
between law and fact.123 Under this approach, pure questions of
law regarding arbitrability stay with the courts, while mixed
questions of law and fact (and straight questions of fact) go to the
arbitrator.124 The court found this approach to be “faithful to art.
943 C.C.P. and to the prima facie analysis test that is increasingly
gaining acceptance around the world.”125 The Canadian law and
fact distinction addresses some of the dissent’s due process concern
in Prima Paint— that is, the misgiving that questions of law could
be sent directly to arbitrators based on illegal contracts.126 (Recall
the dissent in Prima Paint worried about questions of law being
sent to arbitrators who may not even have legal training.)127 Thus,
the Canadian approach perhaps remedies the concern of the Prima
Paint dissent that purely legal issues will be thrown into arbitration
when consent to arbitration itself is questioned, by reserving
questions of law for the courts. The Canadian approach does not,
however, answer the broader concern of “unconsented” contracts
forcing a party into arbitration. As the dissent was equally
troubled in Prima Paint,128
If Prima’s allegations are true, the sum total of what the Court does here is to
force Prima to arbitrate a contract which is void and unenforceable before
arbitrators who are given the power to make final legal determinations of
their own jurisdiction.
The Canadian approach would send to arbitration an arbitr-
ability dispute in which the purported lack of contractual consent
is factually contested, which surely must be a non-trivial subset of
such disputes.129
The fact-law distinction, therefore, does not resolve the concerns
that most irked those sympathetic to the Prima Paint dissent.
Indeed, in the Dell case itself, Dumoulin’s argument required “not
only an interpretation of the law, but also a review of the
123. Dell Computer, supra, paras. 84-85.
124. Dell Computer, supra, para. 85.
125. Dell Computer, supra, para. 83. The law/fact distinction of null and void review is
surely animated by the belief that this will also instruct the degree of appellate
deference when a court sits in review of an arbitral award under s. 943 C.C.P.
Law/fact distinctions are oft-used in crafting appellate standards of review.
126. See supra, section II(1).
127. Ibid.
128. Prima Paint, supra, footnote 1, at p. 425 (Black J. dissenting).
129. For example, the court cites Kingsway Financial Services Inc. v. 118997 Canada
Inc., [1999] Q.J. No. 5922, J.E. 2000-225 (Que. C.A.), as an example in which the
Court of Appeal simply referred the case to arbitration when buyer sued seller on
the basis of error induced by fraud. Dell Computer, supra, footnote 2, para. 81.
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documentary and testimonial evidence introduced by the par-
ties.”130 Based on the fact-law test adopted by the court, the matter
should have been referred to arbitration.131 Presumably a
challenge to consent like the unconscionability argument for-
warded in Rent-A-Center would similarly require intense factual
analysis and would likewise wind up before an arbitrator under the
Canadian approach. Accordingly, although the Canadians articu-
lated a different test from Prima Paint, the same outcome that
concerns those who believe arbitration is only legitimate if based
on a voluntary contractual agreement remains: a claimant who
insists she never consented to an underlying contract purportedly
showing her agreement to arbitrate can be forced to plead her
consent-based grievance to an arbitrator she may have never
authorized.132
4. Redux: Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc.
Having settled on a Canadian approach, the Supreme Court of
Canada jumped back in again with its divided judgment in Seidel v.
TELUS Communications Inc.133 which once more involved the
arbitrability of a consumer contract dispute.134 The case was
brought by Seidel, a customer of TELUS’s cellular phone services,
who claimed that TELUS falsely represented how it would calculate
air-time for billing purposes in its contract.135 Her complaint
alleged, among other things, entitlement to relief under the British
Columbia Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act136
(BPCPA), which explicitly confers trial court jurisdiction by assuring
aggrieved parties they “may bring an action in Supreme Court.”137
TELUS attempted to stay the court proceedings and proceed to
arbitration ‘‘pursuant to s. 15 of the [Commercial Arbitration
130. Dell Computer, supra, at para. 88.
131. Dell Computer, supra.
132. Although, to be sure, the judicial review statutorily accorded arbitrability
decisions in Canada makes the issue less stark than Prima Paint’s rule, which is
coupled with only Spartan judicial review under the FAA.
133. Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., supra, footnote 3.
134. Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., supra.
135. Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., supra, at para. 10.
136. S.B.C. 2004, c. 2.
137. Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., supra, footnote 3, at para. 1. Section 172 of
the BPCPA reads in pertinent part that “a person other than a supplier, whether or
not the person bringing the action has a special interest or any interest under this
Act or is affected by a consumer transaction that gives rise to this action, may bring
an action in Supreme Court.” Supra, at para. 5 (emphasis in original).
2013] APresumptively BetterApproach toArbitrability 187
23
Pottow et al.:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
Act],’’ based on the arbitration clause in the cellular services
contract signed by Seidel.138 Seidel resisted the stay by claiming
the BPCPA’s specific conferral of a right to bring an action in the
B.C. Supreme Court abrogated any purported waiver of that right
under an arbitration clause.
The trial court held that Dell Computer, which was decided
under Québec law, did not control a British Columbia case,139 and
so Siedel’s case should be governed by the controlling B.C.
precedent of MacKinnon v. National Money Mart Co.140 (“Mack-
innon 2004”), a case holding that arbitration agreements become
“inoperative” under the CAA if a class action is certified.141 Because
the certification motion remained pending, the court deferred
consideration of TELUS’s request for a stay to compel arbitration
until it could be seen whether a class would be certified and
Mackinnon 2004’s rule barring arbitration would be invoked. It
therefore did not need to reach the question of BPCPA abrogation of
the arbitration clause. The B.C. Court of Appeal reversed and held
that the CAA and Québec law (as interpreted in Dell) both
“stemmed” from the New York Convention, and thus contained
no substantive differences. Accordingly, Dell functionally over-
ruled Mackinnon 2004.142 The Court of Appeal, no longer bound
by Mackinnon 2004, held against Seidel on her statutory
abrogation claim, reasoning that arbitration clauses are not
waivers of substantive rights (only waivers of forum) and so are
in no way relevant to the BPCPA.143 The appellate court thus
138. Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., supra, at para. 12. The Commercial
Arbitration Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 55 (CAA), states in pertinent part that:
If a party to an arbitration agreement commences legal proceedings in a court against
another party to the agreement in respect of a matter agreed to be submitted to
arbitration, a party to the legal proceedings may apply, before or after entering an
appearance and before delivery of any pleadings or taking any other step in the
proceedings, that court to stay the legal proceedings.
Supra, at para. 21.
139. U.S. readers of this Canadian journal need occasional reminder that the Supreme
Court of Canada issues authoritative pronouncements of provincial law as a
common law court. Dell Computer, supra, footnote 2, was a Québec case and so
the Supreme Court’s pronouncement was technically an interpretation of the law
of Québec.
140. (2004), 50 B.L.R. (3d) 291, 2004 BCCA 473 (B.C. C.A.).
141. Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., supra, footnote 3, at para. 14. The Supreme
Court of Canada refers to that MacKinnon case as “MacKinnon 2004.” Supra, at
para. 14.
142. Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., supra, at para. 17.
143. Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., supra, at para. 18. The BPCPA reads in
pertinent part: “Any waiver or release by a person of the person’s rights, benefits
or protections under this Act is void except to the extent that the waiver or release
is expressly permitted by this Act.” Supra, at para. 21.
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granted TELUS’s stay to force Seidel to arbitration as required by
the contract.144
The Supreme Court of Canada framed the question as one of
statutory intent: “whether the BPCPA manifests a legislative intent
to intervene in the marketplace to relieve consumers of their
contractual commitment to ‘private and confidential’ mediation/
arbitration and, if so, under what circumstances.”145 The majority
held that it does. The court noted that several provincial
legislatures, such as Québec, Ontario, and Alberta, have legislation
that creates “greater or lesser limitations on arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts,” and so the question was to determine British
Columbia’s intent.146
In terms of arbitrability specifically, the court faithfully followed
the categorical law-fact approach of Dell, explaining that the
statutory construction question was one of pure law and hence
properly before the courts in the first instance.147 On the merits,
the court further held that s. 172 of the BPCPA “provides a mandate
for consumer activists or others, whether or not they are personally
‘affected’ in any way by any ‘consumer transaction,’” to bring a
consumer claim “in Supreme Court.”148 Thus, s. 3 makes any
agreement that requires the parties to waive rights provided by the
BPCPA (like the right to bring an action in a B.C. Supreme Court)
“void,”149 and that rule is indeed substantive.150 Reversing the
appellate court and setting aside in part the stay, the Supreme
Court of Canada decided the BPCPA statutory claims were thus
non-arbitrable but any other claims (e.g., common law breach of
contract) were subject to the arbitration clause and should “be
stayed pursuant to s. 15 of the [CAA].”151
144. Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., supra, at para. 20.
145. Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., supra, at para. 2.
146. Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., supra, at paras. 25-26. Note that the
allocation of power to provincial governments to determine arbitrability matters
stands in contrast to the pre-emptive federal approach in the United States of the
FAA.
Unlike Quebec and Ontario, which . . . ban arbitration of consumer claims
altogether, or Alberta, which subjects consumer arbitration clauses to ministerial
approval, the B.C. legislature sought to ensure only that certain claims proceed to
the court system, leaving others to be resolved according to the agreement of the
parties. [Supra, at para. 40]
147. Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., supra, at paras. 4 and 19.
148. Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., supra, at para. 6.
149. Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., supra, at para. 5.
150. “Ms. Seidel possesses a statutory ‘right’ to take her complaint to the Supreme
Court.” Supra, at para. 33.
151. Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., supra, at para. 7.
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Seidel thus reaffirms Dell’s categorical approach to arbitrability,
although it teases at a subject-matter overlay. That is, because the
contracts at issue were consumer arbitration contracts falling
under s. 172 of the BPCPA, they were not arbitrable. But that
decision was not grounded in a substantive policy of protecting
consumers; rather, it was an antiseptic question of statutory
interpretation, which suggests that common law doctrines (such as,
e.g., unconscionability) have no role to play in the arbitrability
analysis unless and until implemented by a legislative enact-
ment.152 The court made clear that “[a]bsent legislative interven-
tion, the courts will generally give effect to the terms of a
commercial contract freely entered into, even a contract of
adhesion, including an arbitration clause.”153 As one commentator
confirms, by providing exceptions only for “legislative interven-
tion” or ones not “freely entered into,” the Seidel court “hints that
only procedural unconscionability could affect the enforcement of
the arbitration clause, implicitly rejecting all submissions of
substantive unfairness.”154 Interestingly for American comparison,
the Supreme Court also touched on separability, taking an
opposite tack from the arbitration-protective approach of Prima
Paint. It found that the unenforceable class action waiver “was not
severable from the arbitration clause as a whole.”155
Seidel was far from unanimous. The dissent accused the
majority of hostility towards arbitration, resistance it claimed
was “couched as an exercise in statutory interpretation of the
BPCPA.”156 It reminded that, under competence-competence,
because “arbitrators should be the first to consider challenges to
their jurisdiction, the expressions ‘void’, ‘inoperative’ and ‘incap-
able of being performed’ should be interpreted narrowly.”157
Further, the dissent argued that the analysis of voidness and
inoperability should not be used to “sidestep the competence-
competence principle.”158 The dissent, however, did agree with the
majority that the question whether s. 172 provides a substantive
152. “What is clear after Seidel is that the Supreme Court will not preserve wide access
to the courts for consumers subject to one-sided contracts of adhesion; it
abdicates that responsibility to the provincial legislatures.” McGill, supra,
footnote 100, p. 187.
153. Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., supra, footnote 3, at para. 2.
154. McGill, supra, footnote 100, at p. 189, note 63.
155. Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., supra, footnote 3.
156. Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., supra, at para. 101.
157. Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., supra, at para. 117.
158. Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., supra, at para. 119.
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right to a judicial forum is a pure question of law to be considered
first by the court rather than by the arbitrator, and so also re-
affirmed the law-fact distinction of arbitrability established by
Dell.159
IV. REFOCUSING THE DEBATE: SUGGESTIONS
FOR A BETTER APPROACH
Turning from the comparative to the normative, we propose two
criteria on which to base arbitrability presumptions. The first
criterion is the classification of the arbitrability dispute. Consider a
container employment contract with an arbitration agreement
therein. An arbitrability question might arise regarding specific
contractual language (e.g., what does “employment dispute”
mean?). Or a dispute might arise regarding the contract’s scope
(e.g., are these tasks within the scope of employment?). There
might even be challenges to the legality of the underlying contract,
and those challenges might variously be based on substantive
illegality (e.g., usuriousness), lack of consent to the agreement
(e.g., duress), or even lack of a constitutive element to legal
enforceability (e.g., no consideration). There might even further be
disputes about statutory interpretation (e.g., does this agreement
contain a “foreign element”?). In sum, there are myriad ways in
which an arbitrability dispute might arise. While there are
accordingly multiple ways to carve and classify these disputes, a
fundamental distinction exists between those that challenge the
legal character of the underlying agreement and those that
challenge whether the underlying agreement ever came into
existence.160
Although this distinction sounds like the one presented in
Granite Rock, we have a broader notion of meaningful contract
formation that focuses on consent. Existence disputes should
chiefly question the underlying consent of the parties, not the
formal categories of doctrine, such as, for example, distinguishing
159. Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., supra, at para. 141.
160. See Buckeye Check Cashing, supra, footnote 54, p. 444 (distinguishing between
challenges on grounds “that directly affect. . . the entire agreement” from those in
which “illegality of one of the contract’s provisions renders the whole contract
invalid”); AT&TMobility LLC v. Vincent Concepcion, supra, footnote 85; George
A. Bermann, “The ‘Gateway’ Problem in International Commercial Arbitration”
(2012), 37 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, p. 30 (“It does not seem at all unreasonable to require
a party who concedes the existence of a contract, but only contests its validity, to
have recourse to an arbitral tribunal for a ruling on the validity question.”).
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fraud in the factum from fraud in the inducement.161 Pleadings
such as mistake, procedural unconscionability, and material
fraud162 frequently set out to show that, in some basic respect,
an agreement never came into being.163 Such defenses stand in
161. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court itself seems conflicted over where to draw a line.
For example, at one point, it implies the CBA dispute in Granite Rock may not
have been an existence dispute. Granite Rock, supra, footnote 84, at p. 2856 (“The
[formation dispute] is based on when (not whether) the CBA that contains the
parties’ arbitration clause was ratified and thereby formed.”), but then elsewhere
rejects this divide, Granite Rock, at p. 2860 (“For purposes of determining
arbitrability, when a contract is formed can be as critical as whether it was
formed.”). But even this proved too strong a statement, so the court hedged yet
again in a footnote:
In reaching this conclusionweneed not, anddonot, decidewhether every dispute over
a CBA’s ratification date would require judicial resolution. We recognize that
ratification disputes in labor cases may often qualify as ‘‘formation disputes’’ for
contract law purposes because contract law defines formation as acceptance of an
offer on specified terms . . .
Granite Rock, supra, at p. 2860, note 11. Thus, the court settles on the position that
ratification disputes are sometimes formation disputes. The court does conclude in
language we find normatively compelling, albeit buried in a footnote and in noway
seeming to guide the court’s holding: ‘‘But it is not themere labeling of a dispute for
contract law purposes that determines whether an issue is arbitrable. The test for
arbitrabilty remains whether the parties consented to arbitrate the dispute in
question.’’ Granite Rock, supra, at p. 2860, note 11.
The court’s ‘‘formation’’ line (rather than a consent-based divide) perhaps draws
from the distinction between voidable and void contracts. Consider, for example,
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts’ different treatment of fraud in the factum
from fraud in the inducement, deeming the first to ‘‘prevent the formation’’ of a
contract but the second to ‘‘render a contract voidable.’’ SeeRestatement (Second)
of Contracts (1981), sections 163 and 164. It could be in this light that the court
emphasizes formation. That said, other strands of analysis suggest such a
distinction should be irrelevant. See, e.g., Solymar, supra, footnote 6, p. 994, note
13 (discussing the distinction’s relevance and suggesting it may be ‘‘crucial to
determining whether a contract exists for purposes of arbitration,’’ yet adding a
‘‘But cf.’’ citation immediately thereafter to Buckeye and further noting that ‘‘four
Supreme Court justices disregard this distinction,’’ citing Rent-A-Center’s dissent
(‘‘Whether the general contract defense renders the entire agreement void or
voidable is irrelevant.’’)) (ultimately avoiding the question of the distinction’s
significance).
162. Consider the position taken by more than one court that the fraud in the factum/
fraud in the inducement divide is actually normatively critical. Sphere Drake Ins.
Ltd. v. All American Ins. Co., supra, footnote 50:
Fraud in the inducement does not negate the fact that the parties actually reached an
agreement. . . . Butwhether therewas anyagreement is a distinct question. . . .Aperson
whose signaturewas forged [fraud in the factum]hasnever agreed to anything. . . . This
is not a defense to enforcement, as inPrimaPaint; it is a situation inwhich no contract
came into being. . . .
See also Solymar, supra, footnote 6 (recharacterising as a fraud in the inducement
claim one ‘‘garbed in the trappings of a fraud in the factum claim’’ to preclude
judicial resolution under Prima Paint). Solymar, supra, at p. 994. By any other
name, it would still smell as sweet.
163. Beyond the scope of this article is a comprehensive analysis of assent in contract
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contrast to the first type of challenge (legal character disputes),
which includes claims that a putative contract is void against
public policy or is defective due to a statute of frauds, or perhaps
the failure of conditions precedent, i.e., pleadings that admit of a
consensual agreement but nevertheless challenge its propriety on
other grounds.164 A classification of the challenge based on these
different normative categories is more compelling, we submit, than
a pleadings-based division into challenges against “the whole
contract” versus “the specific arbitration provision,” as adopted in
the United States, or on “legal” versus “factual” disputes, as in
Canada.
Second, classification should be made not just of the arbitr-
ability dispute but of the underlying contract. Not all contracts are
created equal. For example, adhesion contracts are different from
those that are bargained for at arm’s length by sophisticated
parties. Adhesion contracts often involve unequal bargaining
power, the weaker of the two parties being unable to negotiate
individual terms.165 Consent-based challenges to contract forma-
tion are not only categorically different from other challenges to
enforceability of a contract (our first consideration), but they are
especially worrisome in the context of adhesion contracts, where
law. We are inclined to conceive of fraud in the inducement as negativing consent
in the same way that fraud in the factum does, but if we envision consent as a
continuum, then surely fraud in the factum is “worse” along that continuum. As
such, our tentative reaction would be to push back at the cases that see fraud in
the inducement as “merely” tainted and reversible consent, but consent none-
theless; we see the normative defect in the meeting of the minds in these cases as
much more troubling. For a recent thoughtful treatment, see Margaret Jane
Radin’s Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law
(Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2012). We concede to be
pushing against some established contract law doctrine here. See, e.g., Dialysis
Access Center, LLC v. RMS Lifeline, Inc., 638 F.3d 367 (1st Cir. 2011), pp. 378-379
(analyzing Puerto Rican contract law’s concept of “dolo” or “dolus,” which
deems deceit in contract formation as leaving a contract “tainted” but none-
theless still “a contract” and imposing a four-year limitations period for
nullification). Candidly, we admit inter-author disagreement over the proper
situation of a standalone claim of substantive unconscionability along a consent
continuum (i.e., whether it crosses the line of no consent or whether it is merely
an instance of an “invalid” or “illegal” consensual contract).
164. The claimant in Buckeye, for example, challenged the contract on the ground of
usurious interest rates — a claim that did not relate to consent or formation in
any specific way. Supra, footnote 54, at p. 440. See also Solymar, supra, footnote
6, at pp. 997 and note 17 (failure of condition precedent). See generally Bermann,
supra, footnote 160, p. 30 (“It does not seem at all unreasonable to require a party
who concedes the existence of a contract, but only contests its validity, to have
recourse to an arbitral tribunal for a ruling on the validity question.”).
165. See 1 Domke on Com. Arb. § 8:26.
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autonomy is already on shaky footing. Surely the constitution of
the employment contract that Antonio Jackson signed with Rent-
A-Center stands in sharp contrast to that of the sales contract
worked out between the businesses of Prima Paint and F&C.166 No
one contends Jackson played even a remote role in drafting the
substantive provisions of the contract, including the arbitration
agreement. Prima and F&C, by contrast, very well likely bargained
for arbitration, specifically and mutually. Consequently, in
situations where consent is called into question by an “existence”
challenge to contract (following our classification), we might craft
appropriate procedural rules, such as presumptions based on the
class of contract, to favour or disfavour arbitration. For example,
a presumption of consent could attach to arm’s-length transactions
but be reversed in the context of adhesion contracts.167
In thinking about crafting interpretative presumptions based on
these considerations, we are also mindful of the consequences of
error. Arbitrability errors, we submit, pose a unique threat to non-
consenting parties. To be sure, all contract interpretation errors
pose a threat to non-consenting parties; holding a party legally
bound to that which he has not consented — under the rubric of
contract law — creates what Margaret Jane Radin would call a
normative embarrassment.168 Unlike discrete contractual provi-
sions, however, such as a condition for performance, or even
important ones, such as a price term, arbitration clauses have
global effect: they shift all terms of a contract that may fall into
dispute out of the judicial forum.169 Indeed, dispute of the
contested term collapses into the function of the term itself. To
166. For an overview of the evolution of employment contracts under the FAA, see
Meredith Goldich, ‘‘Throwing Out the Threshold: Analyzing the Severability
Conundrum Under Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson’’ (2011), 60 Am. U. L.
Rev. 1673, p. 1686-1689.
167. Some jurisdictions go so far as to prohibit pre-dispute arbitration contracts in the
consumer and employment spheres. See Karen Halverson Cross, “Letting the
Arbitrator Decide Unconscionability Challenges” (2011), 26 Ohio St. J. on Disp.
Resol. 1, p. 35 (“Since 1994, the 27 countries of the European Union have been
obligated to maintain national laws prohibiting the enforcement of standard-
form, pre-dispute arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts.”).
168. See Radin, supra, footnote 163. See also Anny Vexler, “Margaret Jane Radin
Gives 2011 Grafstein Lecture: Boilerplate is changing our legal universe,”
University of Toronto, Faculty of Law, News, June 11, 2011, online: 5http://
www.law.utoronto.ca/visitors_content.asp?itempath=5/5/0/0/0&spec-
News=954&cType=NewsEvents4.
169. See, e.g., Bermann, supra, footnote 160, p. 49:
The courts treat arbitrability, in the narrow sense in which I define that term, as a
gatewaymatter, but not because the inquiryhas an arbitration-specific character; they
do so because it entails the core judicial function of statutory interpretation and
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wit, suppose a price term is contested. Resolution of that dispute,
even if resulting in an erroneous outcome, still is heard before a
court. Such is the consequence of living in a world with litigation.
By contrast, if an arbitration term is contested, the false positive
error is profound. All disputes of anything that might go wrong
under the contract — ever — are tainted. To be sure, consenting
parties are free to waive recourse to trial, but because arbitration
clauses change the essence of the containing contract — rendering
it in some important sense “extra-judicial” — the consequence of a
false-positive mistake is to remove from parties, who could be
adhesion contract signatories, all legal protection and oversight.170
Accordingly, not only do we contend that challenges to consent
are categorically different from other garden-variety challenges to
contractual validity — and that in adhesion contracts those
concerns are magnified — we also believe that the consequences of
falsely holding one to arbitration in the absence of consent in this
context are worse than the harms of falsely denying parties
arbitration who consented to it. Therefore, in case of doubt
involving adhesion contracts, a tie should go against arbitration.
We base this conclusion on the belief, especially with regard to the
adhesion contracts that permeate the consumer realm, that weaker
parties systemically prefer court resolution to private arbitration,
notwithstanding its purported efficiency.171 This is in part based
on empirical assumption and in part on populist belief in a “right,”
at least in the United States, to public adjudication of grievances
because the issue has a sufficient public policy dimension to warrant early judicial
determination.
170. Cf. Prima Paint, supra, footnote 1, p. 414 (Black J. dissenting) (detailing
legislative history of the FAA showing support of special protection for weaker
parties to adhesion contracts when enforcing arbitration provisions).
171. Such preference may rest on factors such as a perceived arbitrator bias toward
companies over the consumer. See Center For Justice and Democracy at New
York Law School, “Fact Sheet: Mandatory Binding Arbitration — A Corporate
End Run Around the Civil Justice System” (March 5, 2012), online: 5http://
centerjd.org/content/fact-sheet-mandatory-binding-arbitration-corporate-end-
run-around-civil-justice-system4; Arbitration Activism: How the Corporate Court
Helps Business Evade Our Civil Justice System, A Report by Alliance for Justice,
2011, available at5 www.afj.org4. Many consumer claims are not viable unless
they are aggregated in a class proceeding. Griffin v. Dell Canada Inc. (2010), 315
D.L.R. (4th) 723, 2010 ONCA 29 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused (2010), 316
D.L.R. (4th) vii, [2010] 1 S.C.R. viii (S.C.C.). As the Griffin court noted:
Both academic research and the common sense . . . indicate that suppliers and sellers
regularly insert arbitration clauses in order to defeat claims rather than out of a
genuine desire to arbitrate disputes with consumers. Such disputes often involve small
claims that are not individually viable [assuming they are coupled with a common-
place bar on class proceedings]. [Supra, at para. 29, alteration added]
2013] APresumptively BetterApproach toArbitrability 195
31
Pottow et al.:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
(which could be plausibly found variously under Article III, the
Seventh Amendment, and the common law).172
These foregoing considerations lead us to propose the following
new arbitrability presumptions, which can be seen as both a
rejection and embrace of the separability doctrine:
1. Existence challenges to adhesion contracts (such as mass-
produced consumer or employment contracts) should pre-
sumptively stay in court for pre-arbitration adjudication.
2. Existence challenges to arm’s-length commercial contracts
should presumptively be sent to arbitration for resolution.
3. Character challenges in either context should be sent to
arbitration.173
172. Mandatory arbitration agreements may be at odds with the U.S. Constitution’s
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. At least one author contends that
“courts, legislators, policymakers, and the public have paid very little attention to
the direct tension between mandatory binding arbitration and the right to a jury
trial.” Jean R. Sternlight, “Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the
Seventh Amendment Right to A Jury Trial” (2001), 16 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol.
669, at p. 670. There has been growing U.S. opinion that mandatory arbitration
in the consumer and employment context poses significant legal concerns. See
Martha Nimmer, “The High Cost of Mandatory Arbitration” (2010), 12 Cardozo
J. Conflict Resol. 183, p. 184; Marissa Dawn Lawson, “Judicial Economy at
What Cost? An Argument for Finding Binding Arbitration Clauses Prima Facie
Unconscionable” (2004), 23 Rev. Litig. 463, at p. 465; Nicole Karas, ‘‘EEOC v.
Luce and the Mandatory Arbitration Agreement’’ (2003), 53 DePaul L. Rev. 67,
at p. 69. For discussion of the constitutional implications of arbitration clauses
invoked by third parties, see Nima H. Mohebbi, ‘‘Back Door Arbitration: Why
Allowing Nonsignatories to Unfairly Utilize Arbitration Clauses May Violate the
Seventh Amendment’’ (2010), 12 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 555, at p. 556. For a discussion
of arbitration agreements and the right to a jury trial, as well as how adhesion
contracts in general (which may include arbitration agreements) affect constitu-
tional rights and issues of consent, see Margaret Jane Radin, supra footnote 163.
173. We add two clarifications of these presumptions. First, they should only apply in
court proceedings, such as a Section 2 challenge under the FAA; they should not
arise in arbitration itself. A party to an adhesion contract who knowingly and
voluntarily proceeds with arbitration should enjoy no presumptions regarding
consent; if she later wishes to contend to the arbitrator that the underlying
container contract lacked consent, we propose no evidentiary presumption in this
context, just as we would propose no presumption that an arm’s-length
commercial party exercised full consent. Second, the presumptions should
probably be rebuttable. As a first cut, we suggest casting them as burdens of
production. At the pleading stage, if the party opposing the presumption can
produce a genuine dispute of fact, the presumption ends. In the case of adhesion
contracts, therefore, if the drafting party can plead facts in court that rebut the
presumption against consent (perhaps specific discussion of the contested clause),
the arbitrability dispute should be sent to arbitration; in the case of arms-length
transactions, a party must plead facts in court that rebut the presumption of
consent (such as the presence of a gun) in order for its claim to remain there.
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We elaborate our position. First, perhaps surprisingly, we think
the invocation of the separability doctrine articulated in Prima
Paint and largely accepted abroad in some contexts can actually be
justified in many cases.174 In a standard arm’s-length transaction,
it makes perfect sense to presume the validity of an arbitration
agreement imbedded in a container contract that appears
otherwise regular on its face, even if a consent-based challenge is
brought with respect to that container contract. Since the consent
required to bargain for terms between sophisticated parties is
generally robust, there is no empirical reason to craft a protective
presumption against arbitration, even given our normative
concerns.175 Indeed, severing a delegation clause from a container
agreement that is itself an arbitration contract, such as that found
in Rent-A-Center, might also pass muster, at least among
sophisticated parties, although to be sure such micro-severance is
ungainly.176 As for the normative concerns, our populistly
animated worries dissipate in this context. There is no reason to
think a sophisticated commercial actor is mistakenly or unknow-
ingly forfeiting public adjudication rights. Separability is thus
defensible, at least in this arm’s-length commercial context.
Relatedly, while we agree with the impulse of reserving certain
constitutive challenges for judicial resolution seen in Granite Rock,
we have doubts whether that should have been the outcome with
two sophisticated commercial legal actors, especially when
arbitration was heartily endorsed in all versions of the CBA at
issue in that case.
But approval in one context, even if an important one, in no way
makes us apologists for the crudely undifferentiated approach of
Rent-A-Center, where separability is the invariable rule regardless
of the type of contract and consent-based nature of challenge.
Contrast, for instance, adhesion contracts between parties of
unequal bargaining power. In such cases, the whole of the terms of
a contract are dictated by the stronger party, and consent with
respect to any individual term likely stands or falls with consent to
the contract as a whole. It is difficult to imagine a situation in
which a party can realistically be considered to have consented to a
174. See Rau, supra, footnote 23, pp. 81-82.
175. Cf. Peabody Holding Co., LLC v. United Mine Workers of America, International
Union, 665 F.3d 96, (4th Cir. 2012), p. 104 (“A presumption in favor of
arbitrability generally vindicates the intent of the contracting parties.”).
176. Severing the delegation clause still produces the problem of infinite separability.
See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, supra, footnote 5, p. 2786 (Stevens J.
dissenting).
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boilerplate term of an adhesion contract if not to that contract in
its entirety.177 Thus, separability — premised on the idea that just
because consent is challenged to one term of the contract (sales
terms), there is no reason to think it would be challenged to
another (arbitration) — is less justifiable. Such contracts should
perhaps be excepted from the separability doctrine altogether.178
Yet a policy more solicitous to arbitration — and also worried
about the converse error costs of false denials of arbitration —
might be to have a reverse presumption rather than outright
separability exemption. Thus, if a consent-based claim is brought
against a contract of adhesion containing an arbitration agree-
ment, that agreement should be severed, but to presume its
invalidity, not to maintain it. An adverse party could still bring
evidence to establish consent to the arbitration agreement, but it
would have to do so specifically with respect to that agreement to
compel arbitration.179
Still, such a presumption reversal should only apply to
existence-based claims under our first criterion of classification.
Any claim regarding merely the character of the agreement, such as
its incompatibility with public policy, its unenforceability due to a
statute of frauds, the failure to fulfill conditions precedent, or any
other pleading that admits of an agreement to the contract as a
whole, ought to remain subject to separability, even though such a
challenge broadly impugns the underlying “validity” of the
agreement. This is so, perhaps contentiously for some, even in
the context of adhesion contracts. Cabining the presumption in
this way avoids concerns of undermining the efficacy of arbitration
and likely increases political tolerability.180 A court that adjudi-
177. See Andrea Doneff, “Arbitration Clauses in Contracts of Adhesion Trap
‘Sophisticated Parties’ Too” (2010), 2010 J. Disp. Resol. 235, pp. 268-269
(arguing that, with respect to class arbitration, “because most parties who sign
pre-dispute clauses have insufficient bargaining power to protect their rights,
specific protections need to be built into the law”).
178. Many countries do in fact exempt employment and consumer adhesion contracts
from their standard approach to deciding validity of an arbitration agreement
(such as negative competence-competence). For an overview of these, see Cross,
supra, footnote 167, pp. 35-36.
179. On our approach, contractual agreements to arbitrate are not rendered
categorically invalid as would be the case under the proposed Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); see also Consumer
Protection Act, RSQ, c. P-40.1.
180. See Edna Sussman, “The Arbitration Fairness Act: Unintended Consequences
Threaten U.S. Business” (2007), 18 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 455, p. 456 (arguing that
the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, which would render invalid pre-
contractual agreements to arbitrate in consumer, employment or franchise
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cates the validity of a contract will usually also be required to
adjudicate the claims of the parties.181 Reversing the separability
presumption with respect to all validity pleadings would subse-
quently transform nearly any dispute about arbitrability into a
non-arbitrable litigation. Such a blanket rule could do as much
violence to contract principles as its inverse.182
Reversing separability in adhesion contracts in instances of
existence-based challenges also serves to protect the parties better
than the law-fact distinction adopted in Canada. Presumably it is
not just the right to court adjudication of legal issues that a weaker
party requires; existence-based challenges will frequently, if not
always, require a finding of fact. Imagine, for a moment, what such
a challenge to consent might look like. Is it more likely that the
parties stipulate to the use of a gun but then litigate the esoteric
legal question whether a gun threat constitutes duress, or is it more
likely that parties dispute more fact-dependent questions such as
whether a gun was ever used, and if so, whether harm was ever
seriously intended, etc.? We think the latter.183
Taken together, we therefore submit these arbitrability pre-
sumptions to maximize the prospects for achieving the following
goals:
1. Arbitration as a general practice not be eroded by an
overbroad rule allowing any and all contract validity challenges
to be adjudicated by a court (Dell’s concern).184
2. Consent be honoured in arm’s-length transactions such that no
party will be unwittingly deprived of mutually bargained-for
arbitration (Prima Paint’s concern).185
disputes from enforcement, would “lead to the abrogation by Congress of
contractual terms that reflect international arbitration norms and cause
disruption to U.S. business-to-business arrangements”).
181. Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, supra, footnote 5, p. 2779 (Steven J.
dissenting) (distinguishing Prima Paint from Jackson for this very reason).
182. See Sussman, supra, footnote 180.
183. Cf. Bailey v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 209 F.3d 740 (D.C. Cir. 2000), p. 743:
It is unclear in this case whether the District Court’s finding that Mr. Bailey never
agreed to arbitration is a simple questionof fact or amixedquestionof lawand fact.At
first blush, the issue appears to raise a question of fact regarding the parties’ intent.
Unfortunately, the question is not so simple.
184. The purpose of the FAA was to create a “principle of nondiscrimination in
enforcement” of arbitration agreements. Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect
Status (2011), 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1233, p. 1237. Thus the FAA “does not demand
the impossible feat of placing arbitration agreements on the ‘same footing’ as all
other agreements. Instead, it seeks the more modest goal of leveling the playing
field between arbitration and litigation.” Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal Opportunity for
Arbitration (2011), 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1189.
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3. Consent be honoured in adhesion contracts by protecting the
weaker parties in a similar fashion — no party will be shipped
off to arbitration without consenting to it (First Options’
concern, recognized but not fully resolved by Granite Rock).186
Revisiting the descriptive realm, we briefly critique the cases in
conclusion. Courtroom challenges brought to contracts with
arbitration clauses negotiated at arm’s length by sophisticated
parties, such as the one implicated in Prima Paint, are rightly
rejected unless shown to go specifically to the arbitration
agreement. Challenges brought to contracts of employment such
as the one at issue in Rent-A-Center should not have been subject
to separability in the face of an unconscionability challenge, absent
a showing of specific consent. Similarly, consent-based claims
against consumer contracts of the type in Dell should also
presumptively not have gone to arbitration. And ironically, the
formation challenge of Granite Rock regarding the CBA’s ratifica-
tion date would probably have been fine to have been adjudicated
by an arbitrator rather than a civil jury. Moreover, as discussed
above, a law-fact distinction yields insufficient protection of
weaker-party consent. It might protect litigants broadly by
reserving for them a judicial forum for the resolution of purely
legal questions, but this approach arguably misapprehends the
nature of the rights most in need of protection: litigants who did
not consent to arbitration would still be forced into it, even if
“only” for disputed factual (or mixed law-fact) matters.187
V. CONCLUSION
Questions of arbitrability are logically and practically challen-
ging. Arbitration clauses affect the most basic operation of
185. Although the court in Prima Paint did not explore the extent to which the nature
of the transaction mattered in its analysis, it was clearly worried about denying
arbitration to parties who intended it:
This case presents the questionwhether the federal court or anarbitrator is to resolve a
claim of ‘‘fraud in the inducement,’’ under a contract governed by the United States
Arbitration Act of 1925, where there is no evidence that the contracting parties
intended to withhold that issue from arbitration.
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., supra, footnote 1, pp. 396-397.
186. This would remedy the problem of the FAA rendering arbitration agreements
“super enforceable” contracts. See Sandra F. Gavin, supra, footnote 83, p. 250.
187. Under our analysis, we would actually have parted ways with the Supreme Court
of Canada in Seidel and have allowed the statutory interpretation question to go
to arbitration, but we qualify this opinion by noting our lack of engagement in
any consent-based challenges Seidel might have also brought in her complaint;
none appears to have been litigated in the proceedings.
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contract dispute resolution. They transform contracts through
tribunal assignment and pose unique threats to the basic rights and
responsibilities of parties to a contract. For this reason, no simple,
one-size-fits-all rule is desirable. Recognizing that existence-based
challenges occupy a unique status with respect to arbitration
agreements, and recognizing also that parties to adhesion contracts
constitute a unique category of litigants in need of protection, we
believe that certain classes of arbitrability disputes should be
presumed to require court adjudication, just as we believe other
classes of arbitrability disputes should be presumptively arbitrable.
Properly establishing presumptions based on these classifications
serves all parties in reflecting the most realistic and normatively
attractive default assumptions. Sophisticated parties should not be
required to demonstrate consent specifically to an arbitration
agreement; general separability is appropriate. Consumers and
employees, by contrast, should not be required to show lack of
consent specifically to an arbitration agreement through special
pleading doctrines; separability should be reversed in such
instances. Drawing these lines and properly assigning presump-
tions based on the nature of the challenge and the relative status of
the parties will best protect the expectations of litigants and the
tenability of arbitration clauses in general.
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